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WORK-INJURIES AND THE CONSTITUTION:
CARROLL v. LANZA*
CHARLES EDWARD CLARKt
Industrial accidents produce millions of work-injuries every year;
they also produce a host of litigated cases involving issues of varying
degrees of merit spawned by fertile legalistic thought (for the pur-
pose of establishing or escaping liability). The great bulk of the
cases may be included within the self-descriptive category of "Work-
men's Compensation," for the legislatures of all forty-eight states,'
as well as Congress,2 have enacted statutes specifically addressed to
the solution of the social problems resulting from industrial acci-
dents. Sometimes, however, the industrial accident may occur under
such circumstances, and the case be presented in such manner, as to
cause the issues involved to escape the confines of the customary
category and to appear within the limits of some other familiar legal
category not normally viewed as a suitable receptacle for the prob-
lems posed by work-injuries. Thus, while the circumstances of oc-
currence of the injury may clearly be such as to bring it within the
scope of the workmen's compensation statute and justify the imposi-
*349 U.S. 408 (1955).
t Professor of Law, St. Mary's University and Ass't Editor-in-chief, NACCA
Law Journal.
1. ALA. CODE tit. 26, §§ 253-325 (1940); ARiZ. CODE ANN. §§ 56-901 to -977(1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1301 to -1349 (1947); CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. §§3201-6149 (1937); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 81, §§ 81-1-1 to -19-8 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7416-88 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 2301-97 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 440.01-.57 (1952); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 114-101 to -9901 (1937); IDAHO CODE §§
72-1001 to -1025 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 48, §§ 138.1-.28 (1955); IND. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-1201 to -1228 (Burns 1952); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 85, §§ 85.1-.62(1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-501 to -572 (1949); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 342.
001-.990 (Baldwin 1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1021-1143 (1950); ME. REV.
STAT. c. 31, §§ 1-47 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 101 (1951); MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 152 (1950); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.140-.230 (1950); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 176.01-.81 (West 1947); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 6998.01-.59 (1952); Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 287.010-.800 (1949); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 92-101 to -1222(1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-101 to -190 (1952); NEV. COMP. LAWS §§ 2680-
2823 (1929); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 281, §§ 1-54 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
34:15-1 to -120 (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-10-1 to -35 (1953); N.Y. WORK-
MEN'S COMP. LAW §§ 1-401; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1950); N.D. REV.
CODE §§ 65-0101 to -1003 (1943); OHIO CODE ANN. §§ 1465-37 to -112 (1940);
OIKL-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, §§ 1-175 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. e. 656; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-28 (1952); S.C. CODE §§ 72-1 to -504 (1952); S.D. CODE tit. 64(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 50 c 9-12 (1955); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 8306-09 (1941) ; UTAH CODE AkNN. §§ 35-1-1 to -106 (1953) ; VT. REV. STAT.§§ 8048-8164 (1947); VA. CODE §§ 65-1 to -134 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51;
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2494-2545 (1955); Wis. STAT. §§ 102.01-.65 (1953); Wyo.
COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-101 to -149 (1945).
2. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424(1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1952)- Federal Employer's Compensa-
tion Act, 39 STAT. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-801 (1952), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 800-01 (Supp. III, 1956).
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tion of the resulting economic loss upon the industry which "set
the stage" for the injury, it may nevertheless have also been brought
about by and through the fault of some person or agency not im-
mediately associated in the industry. In such instance, the single
work-injury involves both a workmen's compensation claim, in which
questions of fault are immaterial, and a tort claim which normally
rests upon a concept of some form of fault. This collision of basic
theories of liability presents a policy question: Should the industry
charged with the economic burden of work-injuries regardless of
fault continue to bear that cost where the work-injury is demon-
strably due to the fault of an "outsider"?
If this single work-injury was suffered in an employment relation-
ship with an industry extending beyond the jurisdictional boundaries
of policy-making bodies, and the policies made in the respective
affected jurisdictions were diametrically opposed, the simple work-
injury problem, complicated by overtones of tort, has truly become a
conflict-of-laws problem. Furthermore, because of the due process 3
and full faith and credit' clauses of the United States Constitution
(leaving aside others)5 the final resolution of this conflict-of-laws
problem may not necessarily rest with the "last word" of the judiciary
of a sovereign state, but may become the subject of determination
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus the simple work-
injury, normally thought of only as a matter falling within the limits
of "Workmen's Compensation," complicated with a policy question
because of its tort overtones and confused with conflict of laws be-
cause of its response to economic pressures irrespective of jurisdic-
tional bounds, has become, also, a constitutional law problem. If,
then, the parties to a controversy arising from a simple work-injury
peradventure were citizens of different states and had resort to a
federal court, bound by all of the rules applicable thereto, still another
familiar legal category, judicial administration, has been drawn
into the legalistic vortex of what appeared to be a simple work-injury.
This is Carroll v. Lanza.
Carroll, a resident of Missouri, was hired in Missouri by Hogan, a
3. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
5. E.g., the commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. The recent decision,Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U.S. 528 (1956), determining that the
exercise of jurisdiction to award compensation for death within the state would
not impose an "undue burden" upon interstate commerce, is thought to lend
indirect support to the conclusions of this article. In this case it was stated:Whatever dollars-and-cents burden an eventual judgment for claimants in
the position of petitioners may cast either upon a carrier or the State's fund
is insufficient, compared with the interest of the State in affording remedies
for injuries committed within its boundaries, see Car'roll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408, to dislodge state power.
Id. at 531. See also 17 NACCA L.J. 118-21 (1956), reporting and criticizing the
contra decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona (286 P.2d 214) in the same case.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/4
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Missouri painting contractor. Lanza, a Louisiana electrical contractor
who had a government construction contract for work on a dam in
Arkansas, subcontracted with Hogan to furnish labor and materials
for part of the work. While working for Hogan in Arkansas, Carroll
was injured in the course of his employment. Carroll's injury was
due to the negligence of Lanza's employees. Without any formal
proceedings or award in either Arkansas or Missouri, Hogan's work-
men's compensation insurance carrier voluntarily began making
weekly compensation payments of $30 per week, pursuant to the
Missouri law. Carroll had no knowledge of any rights which he might
have under Arkansas law, but the maximum compensation benefits
available under that law were only $25 per week." Carroll received
thirty-four weekly compensation payments of $30 each under the Mis-
souri law. Thereafter he notified Hogan's carrier that he wanted to
receive compensation under the Arkansas law, and appropriate papers
were filed with the Arkansas Commission and compensation benefits of
$25 per week were then paid to Carroll. While receiving weekly
payments under the Arkansas law, Carroll filed a tort action against
Lanza, .based upon the negligence of his employees. Hogan and
his insurance carrier intervened, seeking to recoup, by lien on any
recovery, for the amount they had paid to Carroll as compensation.
Under the law of Missouri, a subcontractor's employee cannot take
compensation from his immediafe employer and also sue the general
contractor as a third party ;T however, such a suit is permissible under
Arkansas law.8 Both states' laws have similar provisions to the effect
that benefits under the workmen's' compensation law shall be exclu-
sive.9 Lanza removed Carroll's suit to the federal court on diversity
of citizenship and moved for summary judgment, asserting that
the Missouri workmen's compensation law was applicable to Carroll
and that it afforded him his exclusive remedy. The trial court re-
jeeted this contention and entered judgment for $18,000 in favor
of Carroll and the intervenors. The court of appeals, relying upon
Magnolid Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,10 reversed on the ground that full
faith and credit required the Arkansas courts, and the federal courts
in Arkansas exercising jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizen-
ship, to give effect to what the court of appeals regarded as a final
and exclusive award to Carroll under the Missouri law. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1312,-1313 (1947).
7. Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153 (1938).
8. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 (1947).
9. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1304 (1947) with Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.120
(1949).
10. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WORK-INJURIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
judgement of the district court." Full faith and credit does not compel
a forum in the state of injury to enforce a sister-state statute os-
te sibly applicable to the injury which reflects a policy contrary to
that of the forum state.
The majority opinion, ably written by Mr. Justice Douglas, in-
cludes a critical evaluation of those decisions whose thrust being mis-
conceived led to the erroneous decision of the court of appeals.
Here no adjudication had been sought or obtained in Missouri; hence
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, which dealt with a final award of
compensation, was inapplicable.2- Furthermore, this was not a case
where an employee, knowing of two remedies which purported to be
mutually exclusive, chose one as against the other and was thereby
precluded by the law of the forum.- In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n,14 there was a "departure" from the rule
of Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper- and the Court allowed the
compensation act of the place of the injury to override the compensa-
tion act of the home state, where that act was obnoxious to forum-
state policy. Thus, while a statute is a "public act" within the mean-
ing of the full faith and credit clause, that provision of the Constitu-
tion does not require a state to substitute for its own statute, applica-
ble to persons and events within its jurisdiction, the statute of another
state, reflecting a conflicting and opposed policy. The fact that
here it was a common-law action that was asserted against the exclu-
siveness of the remedy of the home state does not present a material
difference: "[I]n these personal injury cases the State where the
injury occurs need not be a vassal to the home State and allow only
that remedy which the home State has marked as the exclusive one."' 6
The state in which the tort is committed certainly has a concern in the
problems following in the wake of the injury, and its legislation con-
cerning such problems is a traditional exercise of powers of sover-
eignty. Therefore, Arkansas has a legitimate interest in opening
her courts to suits of this nature, even though in this case Carroll's
injury may have cast no burden on the state or on its institutions.
This is not a case like Hughes v. Fetter,1 for Arkansas, the state of
the forum, is not adopting any policy of hostility to the public acts of
11. The opinion of the District Court, 116 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ark. 1953),
is reported with approval by Dean Roscoe Pound in 13 NACCA L.J. 131-33
(1954). The decision of the Eighth Circuit is at 216 F.2d 808 (1954).
12. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 410-11 (1955).
13. Ibid. The language of "mutually exclusive remedies" seems referable to a
case such as Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926), and to a
choice between the Federal Employers' Liability Act or a state's workmen's
compensation act.
14. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
15. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
16. 349 U.S. at 412.
17. 341 U.S. 609 (1951). See also First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
342 U.S. 396 (1952).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/4
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Missouri. It is choosing to apply its own rule of law to give affirma-
tive relief for an action arising within its own borders.
Missouri can make her Compensation Act exclusive, if she
chooses, and enforce it as she pleases within her borders. Once
that policy is extended into other States, different considerations
come into play. Arkansas can adopt Missouri's policy if she
likes. Or, as the Pacific Employers Insurance Co. case teaches,
she may supplement it or displace it with another, insofar as
remedies for acts occurring within her boundaries are con-
cerned."8
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Burton and Harlan,
dissented. 9 In presenting an extensive review of decisions concerning
the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter agreed that Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt had been
misapplied by the court of appeals.2 0 Contending that the instant case
squarely presented the Clapper problem, he urged: "[I]f Clapper is
to be overruled.., it should be done with reasons making manifest
why Mr. Justice Brandeis' long-matured, weighty opinion in that
case was ill-founded.' ' 21 His principal thesis, however, bottomed on
the Erie rule,22 was that the full faith and credit question could be
avoided because the court of appeals had misread the Missouri law
as to the immunity offered prime contractors from common-law suits
by employees of subcontractors under Missouri workmen's compen-
sation law. His interpretation of the Missouri case law was that
Missouri courts would allow the instant suit to be maintained against
Lanza since the ordinary third-party immunity would not extend to
him because he was not subject to Missouri workmen's compensation
law as an employer. Justice Frankfurter also argued that the 1948
amendment of section 1738 of title 28, U.S.C., supplied added force
to compulsory extraterritorial enforcement of state statutes-a force
not present when earlier decisions of the Court were handed down.23
His recommendation, however, was that the case be remanded "to the
Court of Appeals with instructions to determine whether our reading
of Missouri law is wrong."
2 4
When it is recalled that the Supreme Court has rather consistently
followed a policy of not passing upon constitutional questions if the
case before it can be determined on other grounds, it would appear, at
18. 349 U.S. at 413-14. This admits that the minimal formal contact of in-jury alone is sufficient for constitutional purposes.
19- Id. at 414-26.
20. Id. at 420 n.2.
21. Id. at 421-22.
22. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See 349 U.S. at 422-26 for
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's argument.
23. This point loses force, however, in light of the decisions in Clapper and
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). Cf. Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
24. 349 U.S. at 426.
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least superficially-and viewed as a problem in judicial administra-
tion-that there is considerable merit to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dissent. However, before attempting to evaluate the respective merits
of the views of the majorty and dissenting opinions, despite the risk of
undue repetition, it would seem in order to consider the past decisions
of the Supreme Court which, conceivably, may be thought controlling
in the instant case.
Space limitations preclude detailed analysis of the several bases
upon which state worknen's compensation laws are given extra-
territorial effect. Industrial enterprise and employment-relation ac-
tivities are conducted in accord with economic opportunities and with-
out undue regard for state lines. In recognition of this fact, virtually
every state's compensation law will, in some instances, be applicable
to provide compensation for injuries sustained outside its borders.25
But while it is commonplace to find definitive statutes or decisions
on the question of extraterritorial applicability of a given state's
law. it is not common to find a similarly definitive ruling as to whether
or not a given state's law will be applicable to a work-injury within
its own borders although some other state's law might also be applica-
ble.2 It has been common practice to regard the occurrence of the em-
ployment-related injury within state lines, by itself, sufficient to per-
mit applicability of the local wmorkmen's compensation statute.27 The
result has been that more than one state's law may be applicable to
a single injury. WNhere this is so, and simply because under our
federal system a court in a state is not wholly sovereign, the Supreme
Court of the United States has been called upon to deliver the "last
word" on such questions as "which state" and "how many states" may
provide compensation for a single work-injury.
Foremost among such cases was Clappere--a diversity juris-
diction case decided prior to the adoption of the Erie rule. This case
involved the death of a Vermont employee temporarily performing
services in New Hampshire. Under New Hampshire law at that time,
the claimant could elect, after injury or death, between common-law
employers' liability or workmen's compensation. 29 The Vermont act,
25. See, c.q., Finkel v. Onli-Wa Fixture Co., 101 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. App. 1951);
Horton v. Baruch, 217 S.C. 48, 59 S.E.2d 545 (1950); Western Condensing Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 262 Wis. 458, 55 N.W.2d 363 (1952); GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 1(0 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 189-91 (1937); 11
NACCA L.J. 106 (1953).
26. Oregon is one of the few states which has such a provision. ORE. CiMP.
LAws ANN. § 102-1731 (1940).
27. Sec- eg Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir.
1944) ; Co e V Williams, 177 Kan. 743, 282 P.2d 425 (1955). For a comprehen-
sive discussion of the entire conflicts compensation problem, see 2 LARsON, WoRx-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW c. xvi (1952). See also Horovitz, reviewing the com-
pensation aspects of Carrol z,. Lanza in 16 NACCA L.J. 38 (1955).
28. See note 15 supra.
29. N.H. Pub. Laws 1926, c. 178, § 11.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/4
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which included an express extraterritorial provision, made compen-
sation the exclusive remedy of an employee or his beneficiary against
the employer30 At this time substantive workmen's compensation
laws and their administration had not long passed the experimental
stage, and Swift v. Tyson31 was still the symbolic philosophy of the
Supreme Court. The decedent's administratrix had instituted in New
Hampshire a common-law employers' liability action against the
Vermont employer and the Supreme Court held that the action was
barred by operation of the full faith and credit clause on the exclu-
sive Vermont statute. In so holding, Mr. Justice Brandeis stressed
the "casual" nature of New Hampshire's interest in the case. Mr.
Justice Stone concurred on the ground that in the absence of any local
decisions expressing a contrary policy, the Court's decision should be
rested upon the assumption that the New Hampshire court would
give effect to the Vermont act as a bar to the tort suit in New Hamp-
shire, rather than find an inexorable command for this conclusion in
the full faith and credit clause.
If decision of that question could not be avoided, I should hesi-
tate to say that the Constitution projects the authority of the
Vermont statute across state lines into New Hampshire, so that
the New Hampshire courts, in fixing the liability of the employer
for a tortious act committed within the state, are compelled to
apply Vermont law instead of their own. 2
Without change in the membership of the Court, the Clapper rule
was "relaxed" in Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co.,83 a case in
which the philosophical connotations of Swift v. Tyson were not
directly pertinent. This was an original proceeding by the State of
Ohio to secure reimbursement for compensation paid to the widow of
a Tennessee employee. Both the employee and the employer, a Ten-
nessee corporation, were subject to the Tennessee compensation law.
In allowing the State of Ohio to recover, the Court without considera-
tion of "differences in phraseology between the Tennessee statute
and that of Vermont, 3 4 held that there was no issue of full faith
and credit in any event if the statute in question did not purport to be
exclusive of remedies in other states. Yet in this case, as well as in
Clapper, the issue was whether the workmen's compensation law of
the state in which the injury occurred was constitutionally applicable,
in the face of the assumed applicability of that of the state of em-
ployment.
The Alaska Packers case35 is one of the most important in this
30. Vt. Gen. Laws 1917, c. 241, § 5774.
31. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
32. 286 U.S. at 163.
33. 289 U.S. 439 (1933).
34. Id. at 444.
35. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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series of decisions. Both due process and the full faith and credit
clause were involved in this decision. A unanimous Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Stone, recognized that more than one state might
have a sufficient legitimate governmental interest in a single work-
inu ry to sanction its adjudication of compensability, vel non, under
local law, without violation of due process, and that the full faith and
credit clause had sufficient flexibility to permit any state possessing
such jurisdiction, dependent only upon the forum,36 to apply its own
law in total disregard of any other. This case involved the seasonal
employment of a non-resident alien in Alaska under a California con-
tract calling for application of Alaska law. The work-injury occurred
in Alaska. California was the base of operations, however, and that
state was allowed to provide compensation in accord with its own
law. The Supreme Court sustained this award against due process
and ftll faith and credit objections. The rationale was that California
had a sufficient legitimate governmental interest in the economic
consequences of this work-injury to justify its exercise of jurisdiction
and the application of its own laws without violation of due process.
The clear intimation was that full faith and credit required nothing
more.
In Pacific Employers,3 a compensation case very similar on its
facts to Clapper, the application of California law was approved.
The Court's reasoning was that while the Massachusetts law would
apparently be applicable to the injury suffered in California by the
Massachusetts resident, an employee of a Massachusetts employer,
full faith and credit did not preclude the application of California
law because the Massachusetts law was "obnoxious." One of the rea-
sons offered for this characterization of the sister-state statute was
that doctors in California who had rendered medical aid in that state
might experience difficulty in the collection of their bills if there was
no remedy available in California. Mr. Justice Stone's restatement
of the rule in Clapper, now qualified by the term "obnoxious," should
leave no doubt but that his views as expressed in the concurring
opinion in Clapper, should from this time forth be regarded as the
correct statement of the law. The inexorable command of the full
faith and credit clause was here withdrawn in work-injury cases in
favor of a more flexible rule capable of accommodating the competing
interests of several states in accord with the realities of industrial
enterprise and economic endeavor. It should further be noted that
:. This should not be regarded as a novel concept, nor as one peculiar to the
work-injury problem. See Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941);Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S.
412 (1918).37. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493(1939).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/4
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this "departure" from Clapper took place in the first work-injury
decision involving full faith and credit handed down by the Supreme
Court subsequent to abandonment of the philosophy of Swift W. Tyson
by adoption of the Erie rule; however, the precise point of decision
in Erie-the law to be applied in federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction-was not here involved.
The criterion of the existence of a sufficient legitimate govern-
mental interest in either the state of the injury or that of its con-
sequences was unquestionably established as the sole controlling test
under the full faith and credit clause as well as the due process
clause by Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.38 In this case the District
of Columbia act was held applicable to a fatal injury sustained in
Virginia after the employee had been working in that state for a
period in excess of three years for the same employer because the em-
ployer-employee relation had been created, between residents, in the
District. Under Pacific Employers, it is submitted, there would sim-
ilarly have been no constitutional objection to application of Virginia
law, by its proper adjudicatory branch, to this same injury, had ap-
plication for compensation been made to that forum. An injury within
a state, arising out of and in the course of an employment relationship
operative or "localized" within that state for a period of time in
excess of three years, is unquestionably as great a basis for a finding
of sufficient legitimate governmental interest as was the fact that
California doctors might experience difficulty in collecting their fees
for services rendered in California. Furthermore, under Carroll v.
Lanza, the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States is now
committed to the sensible rule that the fact that the injury occurred
within the state, without more, is a sufficient legitimate governmental
interest to permit constitutional application of the laws of that state
to the work-injury.39
If the problem of the extraterritorial work-injury is regarded as
presenting questions pertinent to jurisdiction within the category of
conflict of laws, the Supreme Court's test of sufficient legitimate gov-
38. 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
39. [I]n these personal injury cases the State where the injury occurs need
not be a vassal to the home State .... The State of the forum also has in-
terests to serve and to protect .... Her interests [Arkansas] are large
and considerable and are to be weighed not only in the light of the facts of
this case but by the kind of situation presented. For we write not only for
this case and this day alone, but for this type of case.... Arkansas there-
fore has a legitimate interest in opening her courts to suits of this nature,
even though in this case Carroll's injury Tay have cast no burden on her
or on her institutions. (Emphasis added.)
349 U.S. at 412-13. Furthermore, it must be noted that the foregoing is recited as
based upon familiar and traditional concepts of legislative jurisdiction pertinent
to acts and events within the state. If such jurisdiction exists, consonant with
the requirements of the due process clause, does full faith and credit require
still more?
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ernmental interest is of sufficient breadth to encompass and approve
the three state-recognized bases of jurisdiction for application of
local law to injuries sustained outside the state: (1) a contract of
employment, or employment relation, made within the state; (2) the
"localization" of the employer-employee relation within the state; or,
(3) the occurrence of the injury within the state."' Due process is
afforded by application of local law in any of these instances, and
the full faith and credit clause raises no additional impediment to the
applicability of a state law based upon any one of the three. And this
is true without regard to the incidental fact that the compensation
law of some other state, basing its jurisdiction upon another of the
three given grounds, might similarly be invoked if that state had been
selected as the forum.
This conclusion, as well as the language of Carroll v. Lanza, poses
consideration of the problem of successive awards. The Supreme
Court has addressed itself to the constitutional aspects of this prob-
lem in two decisions-Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt-' and In-
dustrial Conzn'n v. McCartin.42 Hunt involved the issue as to the
effect of a final award of compensation by the Texas Industrial Acci-
dent Board upon a court-initiated compensation suit in Louisiana
for the excess of compensation recoverable under the laws of the
second state. Hunt sought and received compensation in Texas and,
after the Texas award had become final by lack of appeal to the courts
from the Board's award, filed suit against the employer in the Louisi-
ana courts pursuant to Louisiana law. He was awarded judgment for
the amount of compensation fixed by Louisiana law less the amount
of payments made under the Texas law. This award was reversed by
the Supreme Court; a decision in which four opinions were written.
The opinion of the court might be summarized as a proposition that
the full faith and credit clause compelled the Louisiana courts to
accept the finality of the Texas Board's award as determinative of
the whole of the employee's rights. Chief Justice Stone reasoned that
as the Texas courts considered the Board's award conclusive and en-
titled to res judicata effect in Texas, full faith and credit required
the Louisiana courts to do likewise, and that there could be no award
whatsoever. Justice Jackson wrote that he felt compelled to concur
40. HOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 34-38, 36 n.9 (1944); 2 LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 86.10 (1952), lists six grounds on which the
applicability of a local act has been asserted and agrees that the place of in-jury, the place of making the contract, and the place where the employment rela-
tion exists or is carried out have received constitutional sanction. In addition, he
concludes that applicability of local law based on employee residence or business
localization might also be constitutionally valid.
41. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
42. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
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by reason of the controlling effect of Williams v. Northb Carolina.3 In
a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Black argued that the strong legiti-
mate governmental interest on the phrt of Louisiana in the affairs of
its residents and the employer-employee relationship located in that
state should be sufficient to allow its courts to disregard the res judi-
cata effect of the Texas award except to give it recognition by making
a credit or deduction from the total amount of compensation recover-
able in Louisiana for the amount of the Texas award. This position
expressed the view of the Restatement4 and a considerable number
of states.45 Justice Douglas, in his opinion concurring with Justice
Black, contended that the Williams case was not in point and that an
award by one state should constitute a bar to an award by a second
state only if the workmen's compensation policies of the two states
could not be reconciled.46
By implication, this decision cast some doubt upon the extent to
which the legitimate governmental interest of several states might
simultaneously or successively be manifested by an additional or
supplementary award of compensation. These doubts, however, were
dispelled by the decision in McCartin. McCartin did not expressly
overrule Hunt; but it did so severely limit Hunt as to give rise to the
inference that it had no continued vitality apart from the exact case
then before the Court.47 In McCartin, the employee initiated com-
pensation proceedings before the proper agencies in both Wisconsin,
the state of injury, and Illinois, the state of the employment contract.
Pending the adjudication of the Wisconsin claim, the Illinois Com-
mission entered an award based upon a settlement contract, which
provided that the settlement was not to affect any rights of the em-
ployee under Wisconsin law, and this award was paid. The Wisconsin
proceedings in McCartin, unlike those in Hunt, did not involve a court-
instituted suit against the employer; and the reservation in the Illinois
award could be regarded only as a disclaimer of any intent on the
part of Illinois that its "exclusive remedy" clause should operate be-
yond its own borders. Acting under the supposed strength of the de-
cision in Hunt, however, the Wisconsin courts reversed its Commis-
sion's award in favor of the employee, which had credited the carrier
43. 317 U.S. 287 (1942), dealing with the effect of the full faith and credit
clause upon a Nevada divorce decree in North Carolina.
44. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403 (1934).
45. See cases cited by Justice Black in dissent, 320 U.S. at 457-58.
46. As indicated by the dissent of Justice Black, and demonstrated by the
decisions cited in note 49 infra, state policies as to awards are, in most instances,
susceptible of -ready reconciliation by simply deducting or crediting the award
made by the first state against the successive award. This statement is, there-
fore, not to be viewed as inconsistent with Justice Douglas' language of approval
for the free play of policy in the forum, in the absence of an award, appearing in
Carroll v. Lanza.
47. 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 40, § 85.30; 6 NACCA L.J. 111-12 (1950).
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with the sum awarded and paid under the Illinois award. This action
was reversed by a decision of the Supreme Court which held that
Hunt was distinguishable and, therefore, not controlling.4 8
State courts have consistently taken the position that successive
awards of compensation, as sanctioned by McCartin, are perfectly
proper and the Supreme Court has not again assumed jurisdiction to
pass upon this question.4" And, in Carroll v. Lanza, there was total
agreement that Hunt was not applicable, even if it were to be in-
accurately assumed that the tort recovery against Lanza could be
taken as in the nature of "supplemental compensation." The inac-
curacy of such an assumption is patent: liability for payment of
workmen's compensation arises, without regard to fault concepts,
from the statutorily-regulated status of employer and employee, to
which Lanza was a stranger; liability for the tort arises ex delicto
from the fault of Lanza and his servants, which would be actionable
without regard to the employment-related position of the injured
party; and the carrier liable for the payment of compensation is en-
titled to recoup his losses from the party at fault. However, in the
light of MeCartin, as well as the total agreement of inapplicability
of Hint in Carroll v. Lanza, it seems but natural to inquire: Has Hunt
been silently overruled?
Insofar as the question of successive or supplemental awards of
compensation may be concerned, generally speaking, the answer of
the later cases is a positive "Yes." However, more than that question
was involved in the Hunt decision. Under Texas law, in the absence
of an appeal from a final determination by the Board, the award be-
comes final and the courts have no jurisdiction to pass upon the con-
troversy unless, where applicable, the award is set aside in a separate
48. The crucial statement is the paragraph beginning:
But there is nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to in-
dicate that it is completely exclusive, that it is designed to preclude any
recovery by proceedings brought in another state for injuries received there
in the course of an Illinois employment.
330 U.S. at 627-28. Nor, it is submitted, is there anything to necessarily so
indicate in the Texas statutes, with their judicial gloss, for the exclusiveness
denominated is as to the elimination of common-law rights against the em-
ployer and a statutory bar to compensation in Texas after the employee has
sought and received compensation in some other state. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 8:306, §§ 3, 19 (1941); see Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Skidmore, 222 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). If the statutes were so designed as to bar a sister-
state remedy for an injury in that state, would such a provision be constitutional?
See Justice Black's dissent in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,
454-5,-, (1943), and the reservations of Justice Stone in Bradford Elec. Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163-65 (1932) (concurring opinion). Thus, a search for
some other reason to conclude that McCartin is "distinguishable" seems proper.
49 Cline v. Byrne Doors, Inc., 324 Mich. 540, 37 N.W.2d 630 (1949); Cook v.
Minnapolis Bridge Const. Co., 43 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 1950); Baduski v. S.
Gumpect Co., 277 App. Div. 591, 102 N.Y.S.2d 297 (3d Dep't 1951); cf. Standard
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Skidmore, 222 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). See also 1
NACCA L.J. 29-31 (1948).
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suit brought for that limited purpose. ° This eventuality did not take
place in Hunt. If it had, the trial in the court would have been de
novo, and there would have been no award, for the effect of an appeal
to the courts in Texas is to vacate, rather than to suspend, the award.51
As in most states, the Texas statute expressly makes compensation
the "exclusive remedy" for a work-injury; the compensation is to be
collected from the carrier and the employee is precluded from bring-
ing any suit against his employer.5 2 Thus, for lack of proper appeal,
the Texas award was not only a final determination of the employee's
rights to compensation based upon this law, but was also a determina-
tive adjudication by the proper body over which no court in Texas
could exercise jurisdiction. In Louisiana, on the other hand, there is
no administrative counterpart to the Texas Board-compensation pro-
ceedings are initiated against the employer in the courts." The res
judicata effect of a sister-state judgment, when entitled to extra-
territorial effect under the full faith and credit clause, has long been
recognized as a bar to relitigation of decided matters in even the most
extreme cases.54 Yet when Hunt filed suit against his employer in the
Louisiana court, may it not be said that he was seeking to "relitigate"
an action against his employer which was expressly barred by the
Texas statute, pursuant to which there had been a final adjudication
on the merits, and over which no court in Texas could exercise juris-
diction on review? Small wonder, then, that Chief Justice Stone held
the suit was barred, even for the excess of compensation otherwise
recoverable in Louisiana, by the full faith and credit clause, and that.
Justice Jackson was constrained to concur by the decision in the
Williams case. It is submitted that it is precisely this set of local
peculiarities in the substance and procedure of the workmen's com-
pensation laws of Texas and Louisiana which led to the use of the
language of "exclusiveness" in Hunt, an "exclusiveness" of the Texas
Board's award over which no court in Texas could exercise juris-
diction, which under full faith and credit barred any application
of the court-administered Louisiana law, and that the majority would
never have reached their conclusion in Hunt if the Texas award had
been vacated by appeal to the courts in Texas or if it had been sub-
50. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 Supp. 1955) Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Brannon, 150 Tex. 441, 242 S.W.2d 18 (1951); O'duinn v. Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Co., 219 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. A pp. 1949); Southern Cas. Co. v.
Fulkerson, 45 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Com. App. 1932); Southern Surety Co. v. Arter,
44 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Com. App. 1932); Washington v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 290
S.W. 738 (Tex. Com. App. 1927).
51. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Supp. 1955), Zurich Gen. Ace. &
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 128 Tex. 313, 97 S.W.2d 674 (1936).
52. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (1941). But see Riesenfeld, Forty
Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 7 NACCA L.J. 15, 19-23 (1951).
53. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 41 (1951).
54. See, e.g., Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Fauntleroyr v. Lur,
210 U.S. 230 (1908).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WORK-INJURIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
ject to and set aside in a proper separate suit. The decision in Hunt
should not be strained to apply out of its own extremely limited con-
text; nor should it be regarded as a repudiation by Chief Justice
Stone of his views as expressed in Clapper, which are reiterated in
substance by Justice Black, dissenting in Hunt
Hunt has not been overruled insofar as it stands for the proposition
that where a court lacks jurisdiction to review by trial de novo,
after compensation has been awarded by a board, full faith and credit
precludes relitigatiox in the courts of a sister-state when the party
would be immune from such suit in the first state. This, however, is
a far cry from the proposition hitherto suggested-that the full faith
and credit clause compelled the Louisiana courts to accept the finality
of the Texas Board's award as determinative of the whole of the em-
ployee's rights-and is a rule of extremely limited applicability. But
this construction of Hunt is one which is wholly consistent with the
philosophy of accommodation of the interests of competing states
recognized in Ala.qka Packers, is in accord with the spirit of Erie, and
is one which makes McCartin readily "distinguishable" from Hunt.
So regarded, there is no question but that Hunt was not applicable in
Carrol r . Lanza., for, even assuming that the unique aspects of Hunt
might be duplicated in some set of states other than Texas and Louisi-
ana, there was no adjudication of compensation in either Missouri or
Arkansas to plague the court in Carroll v. Lanza. Thus, it might be
said that Hzunt has enjoyed no greater vitality since McCartin than
(1apper, in its broad sense, enjoyed after the Ohio decision. 6
Did Carr-oll V. Lanza so "squarely" present the Clapper problem as
to call for the protest that, "[I]f Clapper is to be overruled ... it
should be done with reasons making manifest why Mr. Justice Bran-
deis' long-matured, weighty opinion in that case was ill-founded?" 7
Both cases involved common-law suits arising out of work-injuries to
which the compensation laws of more than one state, apparently,
would be applicable and both were tried in federal courts exercising
jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship. But there all simi-
larity ceases. Clapper was decided in an atmosphere redolent of Swift
r. Tyson, and, whatever the reasons therefor might be,58 the prevailing
55, 3120 U.S. at 455.
56. It is submitted that, in the sense that Clapper might be taken as holding
that where, by the law of the state of the employment contract, the workmen's
compensation law of that state affords the "exclusive" remedy, full faith and
credit requires recognition of that state's remedy as "exclusive" by every other
state, the "departure" occurred in the Ohio case, where the State of Ohio, in
which the injury occurred, was permitted to recoup compensation benefits paid
pursuant. to its law from an employer who had workmen's compensation coverage
and immunity from common-law suits by his employees under the "exclusive" law
of the state of the employment contract.
57. 349 U.S. at 421-22.
58. To speculate, some of the Justices then on the Supreme Court might have
concluded, on the merits of a policy choice, that where an employer had by his
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philosophy was one which lent itself naturally to the advocacy of any
principle which the Supreme Court might regard as meritorious. This
is certainly not true at the present time, i.e., in Carroll v. Lanza.
Clapper was a common-law employers' liability suit, permissible as
an alternative to the compensation remedy under the law of only a
single state. 59 Like Hunt, as it is here viewed, Clapper did not have
general applicability, for this right of the employee to elect between
the compensation law and the common-law remedy after the injury
was peculiar to New Hampshire. In its broad sense, Clapper answered
to the description, by reason of the existence in the state in which the
employment contract was entered, of an applicable exclusive-remedy
workmen's compensation statute, that the full faith and credit clause
compelled the courts of the state of injury to deny the injured em-
ployee the remedy available under the local law. In this sense, Clapper
had no greater vitality than Hunt, for, just as MeCartin severely
limited Hunt, the Ohio case severely limited Clapper: The conclusion
of Ohio, reached without considering the "differences in phraseology
between the Tennessee statute and that of Vermont, '" was that there
is no issue of full faith and credit if the statute in question does not
purport to be exclusive of remedies in other states. The language
clearly indicates that Ohio marked a "departure" from Clapper, but
one which may have passed unobserved because of the great difference
in facts as well as of law. If this "departure" in Ohio, abandoning
Clapper in its broad sense just as MeCartin abandoned Hunt, had not
occurred, how then could Alaska Packers, to say nothing of Pacific
Employers, have been decided? Nor does it necessarily seem per-
subscription to workmen's compensation purchased an immunity from common-
law suits by his employees in his home state, sound national policy required that
such immunity be recognized in every other state. Justice Brandeis might con-
ceivably have espousec tie view that the principle. of workmen's compensation
represented the sole hope of salvation for injured workmen and that a contrary
ruling-that the employer's immunity from common-law suits by his employees
could disappear whenever his enterprise and a work-injury resulting therefrom
chanced to cross a state line-would not only lend no impetus but also might
erect barriers to wide-spread acceptance of the principle of workmen's compensa-
tion. Furthermore, the apparent economic overtones should not be overlooked
insofar as adoption of a contrary rule in Clapper might conceivably tend to
discourage the free play of industrial enterprise in accord with economic op-
portunities and without regard to state lines. The fact that these considerations
no longer seem relevant may well be ascribed to the now-universal acceptance
3f the workmen's compensation principle in all of the United States.
59. See text supported by notes 28-32 supra. No other state, even then, made
such a general election available to the injured employee, although, even today,
under the laws of many states there are exceptional circumstances where the
employer may be held liable at common law to his injured employee. Such cir-
cumstances, however, are truly the exception; the rule is that the workmen's
compensation law provides the "exclusive" remedy for the work-injury.
60. 289 U.S. at 444. See note 56 supra. Yet, if these "differences in phrase-
ology"--which it is submitted had no existence for any legal consequence-were
not considered, how may Ohio be distinguished from Clapper, in the sense under
discussion? Does it not seem manifest that, taking Clapper in this sense, Ohio
destroyed it?
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suasive to argue that Clapper stands only for the rule that an em-
ployee who suffers a work-injury cannot maintain a common-law ac-
tion against his compensation-insured employer, even in the forum
of a state other than that in which the employment relation is located.
General adherence to this principle could better be ascribed to adop-
tion of this rule as local law by every other state-a policy determina-
tion on a state-wide basis-rather than to the compulsion of full faith
and credit via Clapper, and policy on a nationwide basis.61 Further-
more, the marked "departure" in Pacific Employers came after the
national uniformity philosophy of Swift v. Tyson had been repu-
diated by Erie. This "departure," as marked by the majority in
Carroll r. Lanza, is simply tacit recognition of the fact that there
would be no real differeace between the Supreme Court making an
opcin and free choice of policy in promulgating a rule of law for
nattnwide adoption under Swift r. Tyson and its selection of the
polieg of some single state and enforcing its nationwide adherence
under the full faith and credit clazuse.
But despite the indistinguishable similarity of the multi-state facts
in Clapper and Pacific Employers, there were two significant differ-
ences between those cases which properly allowed the Supreme Court
to follow the principle recognized in Alaska Packers of accommodation
of several states' competing interests, contrary to Clapper in its
broadest sense, without overruling Clapper. Pacific Employers was
a compensation case, not a common-law suit against the employer,
and neither Massachusetts nor California offered a "New Hampshire"
common-law alternative remedy, although at that time New Hamp-
shire, alone, still did. Thus, if Clapper can be said to have been over-
ruled, it was "overruled" only by the New Hampshire legislature's
actionu in repealing the elective feature in that singular state law
and virtually eliminating the possibility of a recurrence of Clapper 3
Furthermore, and contrary to Justice Frankfurter's assertion,
('arroll e. Lanza did not present the Clapper problem squarely be-
cause the employer was not the defendant in this common-law action.
To now announce that Clapper was overruled would be in the nature
of a purely gratuitous edict.
In the sense that either Clapper or Hunt might be regarded as
establishing constitutional support for a concept of single-state "ex-
clusiveness" of the compensation remedy for a single work-injury,
those authorities were abandoned by the Ohio and McCartin cases.
GI. This seems borne out by the fact that the same policy determination is
reflected by the provisions of all 48 states' laws (see generally note 1 supra) and
there is no "national" workmen's compensation law of general applicability.
62. N.H. RE,. STAT. ANN. c. 281, § 12 (1955).
6:11. Assuredly, there can be but little reason to speculate as to the possibility
that legislatures would amend the present laws to create such an election between
the compensation and the common-law remedies today.
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The contrary rule-that both the due process clause and the full faith
and credit clause had sufficient breadth to admit of the competing
interests of several states-was affirmatively established by the
Alaska Packers decision. Pacific Employers did no more than re-
affirm the principle of that decision upon a fact situation so similar
to Clapper as to put all scholars of the law upon notice that Clapper
was no longer to be strained out of context. Carroll v. Lanza ac-
knowledged that Clapper now rests in a state of suspended animation
-but it goes further.
Carroll v. Lanza was a tort suit. The majority puts it that the
Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Fetter was not controlling."
The Hughes case, a suit for the wrongful death of a Wisconsin resi-
dent killed in Illinois by a Wisconsin defendant, insured by a Wiscon-
sin insurance company, was brought in Wisconsin under an Illinois
statute. The Wisconsin court refused to entertain jurisdiction be-
cause of a local policy against entertaining suits brought under the
wrongful death statutes of other states. This inhospitable policy on
the part of Wisconsin's courts, otherwise fully competent to entertain
jurisdiction, was eradicated by the Supreme Court. It reversed the
decision on the ground that full faith and credit precluded the Wis-
consin courts from closing their doors to a suit for wrongful death
simply because the cause of action arose in another state and went
on to point out that it would not abide a similar conclusion "put off"
on the ground of forum non conveniens because all the parties in
interest were Wisconsin residents. However, in writing for the ma-
jority, Mr. Justice Black was most careful to point out that the ruling
as to the force of the full faith and credit clause was limited to the
Wisconsin policy in attempting to make its courts inaccessible as the
proper and appropriate forum for the trial of a foreign 'wXrongful
death suit. The decision was not to be taken as an inexorable com-
mand with respect to choice-of-law problems on the part of a court
which had opened its doors to such litigation.0 Thus the criticism
in the Hughes dissent, that the majority had imposed a "state of vas-
salage" on the forum, seems to miss the mark and, for reasons subse-
quently discussed, the statement in Carroll v. Lanza that Hughes is
not apposite seems incontestably correct.
While there are tort policy considerations in Carroll v. Lanza, they
are all purely local in character; the negligence, the injury, and the
suit brought thereon arose in Arkansas. Consequently, viewing this
work-injury as a conflict of laws problem, the sole chQice of law prob-
lem to which the full faith and credit clause might be applicable is that
of the two states' workmen's compensation laws and their potential
64. 349 U.S. at 413.
65. 341 U.S. at 612 n.10.
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effect upon the propriety of entertaining the local tort action. As to
this aspect, Hughes is of no moment since it involved a foreign tort,
and the courts in that case, unlike the Arkansas courts in Carroll v.
Lanza, sought to refuse to hear the action. Assuming, as the Court
did in Carroll v. Lanza, that both the Arkansas and the Missouri work-
men's compensation laws were equally applicable to provide a remedy
for the injury, and further assuming, as only the majority did, that the
Missouri law would erect a complete defense to this tort action
whereas the Arkansas law would not, the sole conflict of laws problem
is presented by the conflicting provisions of the respective states' local
workmen's compensation laws. The characterization or classification
of a conflict of laws problem has almost universally been left to be de-
termined by the law of the forum. ' Whether or not the victim of a
work-injury brought about by the interference and fault of a stranger
to the employment relationship should be entitled to recourse against
the third party in addition to receiving compensation from or through
his employer, as well as defining the scope of the employment relation
and identifying those who are "strangers," would patently seem to be
susceptible of no classification other than that of workmen's compensa-
tion policy. 7 Missouri and Arkansas, under the decided cases, clearly
have competing interests in the disposition of this policy problem6s
Either state, as the forum, would be confronted with no constitutional
impediment in making its own policy determination as to whether a
workmen's compensation-inspired immunity should or should not be
available as a defense in a tort action. "[A]s the Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. case teaches, [Arkansas] may supplement [Missouri
policy] or displace it with another .... "1 and Missouri, as the "base
66. This, necessarily, for only the forum can give any vitality to any of the
concepts of characterization or classification, and once any such concept is an-
nounced by the forum it then is a part of the forum's law. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 9 (3d ed. 1949), openly supports general adherence to the resolution
of characterization problems by resort to the law of the forum as the most
feasible. See also STUImERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 8 n.18 (1937). Whether this
should be the rule or not has stimulated much discussion by the continental
writers, because of the sharp differences in classifications occurring from state
to state among the European nations. The laws of the states of the United States
are not so similarly dissimilar. Bearing this in mind, see Dicay, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 3 (;th ed. 1949), wherein five views are set forth as to which law should
govern characterization. Although this English authority does not reach the
conclusion here made, it acknowledges that "the great majority of continental
writers think that the process of characterization must be performed in accord-
ance with the domestic law of the forum." Id. at 66.
67. This, assuredly, at least among the 48 states, which have all adopted
similar workmen's compensation laws for resolution of the primary problem, the
method of relieving the economic pressures of industrial injuries. How the in-
cluded questions within this single characterization should be answered, however,
presents a different problem, and one which has been answered solely upon the
asis of each state's policy determinations made only for itself.
68. Missouri, the local relation of employer-employee there created between
Hogan and Carroll; Arkansas, the work-injury within her borders.
69. 349 U.S. at 413-14.
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of operations," is equally free to apply its own policy if it is the forum;
and the fact that "here it is a common-law action that is asserted
against the exclusiveness of the remedy [does not present] a material
difference.170
What, then, are the respective merits of the majority and dissent in
Carroll v. Lanza? To test the validity of these two positions concerning
a work-injury which might be categorized in a number of "legalistic
pigeonholes," fairness decrees that, wherever the assumption has
been made that the majority was correct, a similar assumption now
be made that the dissent was correct. Assuming it is true that, had
Missouri been the forum for the third-party tort suit, Missouri law
would have afforded no protection by immunity to Lanza, who was
not a Missouri-insured employer,7 should this case have been deter-
mined upon constitutional grounds or should it have been remanded
to the court of appeals for their re-examination of the Missouri law?
In all probability, no single conclusion could be established if the
problem is viewed as the simple policy question: Should this particular
employer, in the position of a general contractor with the injured
workman's employer, be granted the same immunity as is universally
afforded to the immediate employer ? 2 As an exercise in the field of
conflict of laws, the position of the majority seems preferable, for the
jurisdiction of the Arkansas courts, aside from the removal to the
federal court, was never questioned. The characterization or classifi-
cation of the nature of the problem is for the forum-Arkansas.
Considered as a tort case, there is no choice of law problem here be-
cause the tort case is purely local. On the other hand, addressing the
issue as one of judicial administration of the federal courts, and as-
suming, as Justice Frankfurter argued, that the Missouri law offered
no comfort to Lanza as an "immunized" employer, there would seem
to be no justification for the majority's deciding a constitutional ques-
tion which palpably could be avoided in a case where the lower courts
were obligated to follow state law and had incorrectly construed the
meaning and effect of that law. With the presentation of the constitu-
tional question for decision thus left in doubt, it would serve no useful
purpose to review the prior constitutional determinations which
would, necessarily, rest upon the assumption that the constitutional
question had been presented.
To evaluate the relative merits of the majority and dissent upon the
70. Id. at 412.
71. Compare Liddle v. Collins Constr. Co., 283 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. 1955), with
Justice Frankfurter's views in the dissent, 349 U.S. at 422-26.
72. While a clear negative is indicated if the problem is approached as a matter
of regulation of a status (employer-employee) or by testing the immunity upon
the basis of a quid pro quo, the writer believes that, in the main, most answers
would only reflect the long-standing policy determination of some particular state.
See RIESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SociAL LEGISLATION 416-19 (1950).
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fullest possible basis for analysis, it might be useful to assume a
hypothetical case presenting a converse fact situation. Assuming the
employment contract and all aspects of localization had been in Ar-
kansas and the work-injury, the fault of the general contractor's
servants, had been sustained in Missouri, and Arkansas was the forum
for the third-party suit after payment of compensation, does the view
of the majority or that of the dissent provide the better guiding set of
principles for certainty of proper adjudication of the issues involved?
This setting of a hypothetical case roughly approximates the par-
allel facts in the Williamson case- recently decided by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The apparent facts were: An Oregon em-
ployer-employee relationship was created in that state between an
Oregon resident and an Oregon corporation. This corporation's eco-
nomic endeavor extended into Washington as well as Oregon, and the
employee was killed through the negligence of a third party while
in the course of his employment in Washington. The employer had
complied not with the Washington law, but with the Oregon com-
pensation act, although he had been advised that he was subject to
the former. Both states have wrongful death statutes; but while
actions for damages at common law by compensated employees may be
maintained against third parties in Oregon, the Washington compen-
sation law precludes such suits against Washington employers. The
widow had filed claims for compensation under both states' laws and
was receiving compensation under the Oregon law. No action had been
taken upon the Washington claim. She filed suit in the Federal District
Court in Oregon against the third party for damages for wrongful
death under the provisions of the wrongful death statute of Washing-
ton. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The Oregon
compensation law has an extraterritorial provision which authorizes
its applicability to an out-of-state work-injury if the employee was not
subject to the -workmen's compensation law of the jurisdiction in
which he was injured. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that Washington law-both its wrongful death statute as
pleaded by plaintiff and that part of the compensation law which pre-
cludes tort suits against third parties such as this defendant-gov-
erned. The appellate court agreed that the law of the place of injury
governed, but vacated the lower court's action because there was no
finding that the deceased employee was acting in the course of his em-
ployment at the time of his death according to Washington law; hence
the case was remanded for submission of additional evidence and a
finding upon this issue as a predicate for final judgment. In arriving
at this conclusion, the court first decided that Oregon policy was not
opposed to applying the law of a foreign state, and then cited and dis-
73, Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 221 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1955).
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cussed decisions of the Supreme Court concerned with applications of
the full faith and credit clause to work-injuries. However, the opinion
leaves some doubt as to whether its ruling was that full faith and
credit compels the Oregon courts to apply the Washington compensa-
tion law defense in a wrongful death action brought under the
Washington statute, or whether, following Erie, its conclusion was
that the Oregon courts themselves would regard the entire case as con-
trolled by the law of Washington.
A transposition of Justice Frankfurter's views in Carroll v. Lanza
to Williamon would limit the inquiry to the question whether the
court of appeals had misread the Oregon law. As the federal court has
jurisdiction only by reason of diversity of citizenship, the Erie doc-
trine applies to govern the choice of substantive law, and Klaxon 4 has
defined choice of law problems as substantive within the meaning of
Erie. The federal court in Oregon is thus bound to look to the Oregon
law of conflict of laws to determine how an Oregon court would dispose
of the choice-of-law problems. Review by the Supreme Court would
then be limited to the question whether the lower federal court's ad-
herence to the philosophy of Erie succeeded in deciding the litigation
just as a state court would have decided it.
It is generally conceded that the law of the place of injury is to
govern all substantive aspects of a tort suit75 This conflict-of-laws
rule might be described as a general policy, adopted by all courts,
designed to minimize divergence of results occasioned solely by reason
of the accident of the forum.7 6 However, this policy is local and
74. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
75. GoODRICH, Op. cit. supra note 25, at 260-303; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note
25, at 160-89.
76. This basic purpose and policy underlying all rules of conflict of laws, com-
mon to all courts within their own jurisdictions, is to obtain a uniformity of
result regardless of the fortuity of the forum and to apply a system of law
closely connected with the fact situation. But the local adoption of any rule or
set of rules of conflict of laws, in any jurisdiction, tending toward minimizing
divergence of results due only to the accident of the forum is not done for the
reason that uniformity is necessarily good per se. Rather, these rules leading
toward uniformity are adopted because it is thought necessary to apply some
system of law closely and substantially connected with the fact situation in order
to do justice in the particular case. See DicEy, op. cit. supra note 66, at 6-7.
It is clear that the motive for giving effect to, e.g., French law as regards a
contract made in France is not the desire to show courtesy to the French
Republic, but the impossibility of determining the rights of the parties to the
contract justly if that law be ignored.
Ibid. However, if the fact situation in the particular case might be shown to
have a close and substantial connection with separate jurisdictions, each with its
own system of law, each applicable because of the factual connection, does it not
follow that the choice of law in a forum in any such jurisdiction-a choice between
the local conflict-of-laws rule leading toward uniformity and the local domestic-
law rule which might conceivably lead to a different result-should, ultimately, be
made by the local court upon its own weighing according to the balance of justice,
as locally understood, rather than to an unquestioning adherence to an academic
rule whose application would produce a result which the court would regard as
unpalatable or "obnoxious," as a matter of local domestic policy? To suggest an
affirmative answer is not to "fly in the face" of all reason and precedent; neither
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sometimes has been abandoned in favor of some other local policy
which, as regarded by the forum, outweighs the value of the policy
favoring uniformity of result." Such departures from the general
rule that the law of the place of injury goverms the tort are most fre-
quently found in cases where non-tort legal considerations are pre-
sented in a personal injury case, and the forum regards the non-tort
considerations as of greater moment under the law of the forum than
the forum's policy in favor of the general desire to secure the same
result in a tort case as if the action were tried in the state where it
arose., " This weighing of the respective merits of the non-tort con-
siderations in the particular personal injury case against the general
tort policy of referring to the law of the place of the tort can only be
done by the forum in which the case is presented according to its own
law and, if there is a sufficient legitimate governmental interest pres-
ent to satisfy the requirements of due process, there would seem to be
no constitutional objection to the forum making a free and final
choice, even though it is recognized that if the forum were elsewhere,
a different result might well follow.7 Thus, leaving aside the constitu-
can it be described as an attack upon the basic principles of conflict of laws, forit should be apparent that relatively few "foreign-fact?' cases will have a close
and substantial connection with the systems of law of more than one jurisdiction,
and even then, perchance not with the forum's system. Thus, in the great bulk
of "foreign-fact" cases, the choice-of-law problem for the forum is between itslocal conflict-of-laws rule which will refer to a foreign system of law having a
close and substantial connection to the fact situation before it and its localdomestic law which has no such connection with the facts and therefore, in simplejustice, should not be applied. However, if any single class of cases might be
said t" piesent an exception to this order, it is the "foreign-fact" work-injury
case as it is raised within our federal system of states. For, as virtually all
courts and commentators agree, no court confronts the choice-of-law question
until after it has answered the question of existence of jurisdiction in the af-firmative; and jurisdiction, in our federal system, as tested by application of thedue piocess clause, rests upon the existence of a substantial connection between
the forum and the fact situation.
77. Classic examples are: Siegman v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938);Hudson v. Von Ham, 8.5 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927); Kyle v. Kyle, 210Minn, 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941), in all of which the customary conflict-of-laws
rule of referring to the system of law prevailing at the place of the tort was
rejected by the forum in favor of the local domestic relations policy which local
weighinz of justice regarded as preponderant. See also Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive
Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 AtI. 163 (1928), where the same familiar-
conflict-of-laws rule was rejected in favor of a local statutory policy respecting
the liabilities of bailors of automobiles for hire.
78. Cases cited note 77 supra. The problem is one of characterization or
classification of the choice-of-law issue, Who is better qualified than the forum
to determine questions of this kind? Does "justice," as that term may be given
substance by some local forum, preponderate in favor of the local policy upon
matters of domestic relations or the bailment of automobiles for hire, respectinglocal domicibaries, or does it favor disregard of such policies in order to effectuate
the equally-local policy to obtain uniformity of result regardless of fortuity of
the forum? May it not be said that in such cases the fundamental purpose of thelaw of conflict of laws-to achieve justice by the application of some system oflaw closely and substantially connected with the fact situation-is, indeed, well-
served by either choice?
79. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Union Trust Co. v. Grosman,945 U.S. 412 (1918); of. Bogen v. Bogen, 219 NCe, 51, 12 S.B.2d 649 (1941).
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tional questions, the Oregon courts might regard the Oregon policy
in favor of uniform results in tort cases as controlling in 'Williamson
and, in effect, decide the case as a Washington court would apparently
decide it on the basis of Washington law, including the Washington
compensation-law defense. On the other hand, as the case is one
arising from a work-injury for which compensation was being paid
under the Oregon law, the Oregon courts might regard the Oregon
policy in favor of allowing the compensated party to maintain the
third-party action as more important than the Oregon policy favoring
uniformity of result in tort cases, and proceed to decide the case with-
out regard to any Washington law.80 Or, as would seem more probable
here since the plaintiff's pleading in Williamson specifically sets up the
Washington wrongful death statute as the basis of suit, the Oregon
courts might follow the Oregon policy favoring uniformity of results
in tort cases as to the action and apply the Washington death statute,
but refuse to recognize the defense arising from the Washington com-
pensation law on the ground that the question of the compensated
party's ability to sue the particular defendant as a third party is a
workmen's compensation matter, rather than a tort matter, and that
it is to be'governed by the Oregon workmen's compensation law under
which compensation has been paid. Assuming that there would be no
constitutional objection to any of the foregoing alternatives, the task
of the federal court sitting in Oregon in a diversity case is to deter-
mine which alternative the Oregon courts would select and then to
decide the case before it upon that basis.
Two of the four Oregon decisions cited in Williamson by the court of
appeals8' involve applications of local Oregon policy in conflict-of-laws
cases dealing with the problem of a compensated employee's ability to
maintain a common-law tort suit against a third party. While both
involved injuries in Oregon,8 2 the Oregon courts allowed both suits for
damages based on fault and recoveries were had in both despite pre-
vious awards of compensation in other states whose compensation
law, apparently no less exclusive than that of Washington, prohibited
such third-party actions. The Oregon courts treated these prohibitions
as contrary to Oregon public policy and the thrust of these decisions
is in the direction of a similar conclusion with respect to the Washing-
ton compensation policy involved in Williamson. The court of appeals
discussed these cases briefly, but dismissed them as inapplicable to the
80. Under the pleadings, this position seems most unlikely.
81. Personius v. Ashbury Transp. Co., 152 Ore. 286, 53 P.2d 1065 (1936);
Rorvik v. North Pac. Lumber Co., 99 Ore. 58, 190 Pac. 331 (1920), sustained on
-reheain, 195 Pac. 163 (1921).
82. And, as neither was a suit for wrongful death under a sister-state law,
they were not directly in point except insofar as they might be regarded as ex-
pressions by the highest court in Oregon as to its local policy respecting work-
injury suits.
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question in Williamson, which it described as being whether defend-
ant's acts gave rise to a cause of action. It is submitted that this
classification of the question is erroneous. A complaint alleging de-
fendant's negligence proximately causing the death of the proper
party and that plaintiff's decedent was within the provisions of the
Washington wrongful death statute, would clearly seem sufficient to
state a cause of action and support a judgement for plaintiff even in
Washington; the bar in that state based upon its local compensation
law would logically seem to be proper matter for an affimative de-
fense to be set up by the defendant in his answer. It is submitted that
the real question in Willamson was this: Is the cause of action aris-
ing under the Washington wrongful death statute subject to the pro-
hibition of the Washington workmien's compensation law in the
Oregon forum? A negative answer to this question is indicated by
several factors: The open contradiction between the statutory policy
of the two states as to allowing suits by compensated parties against
such third parties as the defendant in Williamson; the two Oregon
decisions previously discussed; and the force of the Oregon award of
compensation to this plaintiff under a law authorizing such award
only if the injured employee was not subject to the jurisdiction of
some other state's compensation law." Furthermore, while not part
of the "law of the case," the opinion of the court of appeals recites
that, in the argument before that court, amici curiae disclosed that
about four years after the accident the Washington commission had
rejected the widow's Washington claim for compensation because the
employer did not have Washington coverage but did have Oregon
coverage and the Oregon commission had assumed jurisdiction.
This occurred after the lower court's ruling in Williamson. For the
foregoing reasons, Justice Frankfurter, following the same line of
reasoning expressed in the dissent in Carroll v. Lanza, might well
conclude that the court of appeals had misread the Oregon law and
remand the case to that court for further study.
But with the case in this posture, what would the court of appeals be
called upon to decide? A remand pursuant to Justice Frankfurter's
rationale would present two issues-not only that as to what the
83. ORE. COMp. LAws ANN. § 102-1731 (1940). While there would be no resjudicata against the third-party defendant, could it assert that Oregon lackedjurisdicticn to apply its own compensation policies in the face of an Oregon
awar(l ,f compensation conditioned upon an implied finding that the deceased
was not subject to the compensation law of the state of injury? Here there is
an award by the same state whose courts are now opened to an action wholly
permissible therein, in which it was found that the law of the state in which the
injury occurred did not apply. Cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430 (194:,). Nor would the contrary determination by Washington, as indicated
by the notice to Williamson's employer, necessarily be fatal. See Treinies v.
Sunshinu Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
84. 221 F.2d at 7 n.4.
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Oregon courts would decide, but also that as to what the Oregol
courts, as bound by the Constitution, could decide. This second issu,
would seem to be of sufficient weight and general importance to meri
a definitive adjudication by the Supreme Court, for this is the sam,
issue, presented upon converse facts, decided by the majority ii
Carroll v. Lanza. The consequence of such a supposed second reviev
by the Supreme Court would be still further delay in already pro
tracted litigation. The alternative would be to leave the question opel
for the piecemeal determination of any and every court confrontei
with the issue, running the risk of possible erroneous and differin
determinations by such courts until such time as the Supreme Cour
would adjudicate the issue. If these alternatives be correct, then-
wholly aside from the merits of the problem of legislative and judicia
treatment of work-injuries-as a matter of sound judicial administra
tion and definitive adjudication of federal constitutional questions, th,
position of the majority in Carroll v. Lanza is much to be preferred.
As has heretofore been suggested, there is presently little reason b
hope for unanimous agreement as to the merits of the legal treatmen
of work-injury problems such as those presented in Carroll v. Lanzi
and Williamson, involving tort policy considerations, knotty problem
in the field of conflict of laws, and questions of the judicial administra
tion of our federal courts. However, in the face of the acknowledgel
risk of straining that decision out of context, Carroll v. Lanza and thi
line of decisions discussed therein and here presents a stimulus t
evaluate the role of the Supreme Court of the United States in its in
terpretation and application of the Constitution to those fields of lay
in which the work-injury problem has sometimes appeared. It i;
possible that by applying the rationale of the series of decisions cul
minating in Carroll v. Lanza to the Williamson case, some conclusioni
may be drawn as to future constitutional developments in the arel
of the work-injury problem. Assuming that the Supreme Court wer
to decide Williamson on the merits under the full faith and credi
clause in accordance with its prior interpretive decisions dealing witl
work-injuries, how might it be decided? Could the Oregon court,
constitutionally apply their own local work-injury policy in William
son ?s5
Assuming that it was erroneous to relegate Clapper to the limbo o:
85. A negative answer is indicated by the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWi
§ 401 (1934), even as altered by the 1948 SUPPLEMENT, as necessitated by th,
"reconciliation of Clapper in Pacific Employers." However, despite the complet
adherence of all American states to the principle of workmen's compensation a
the primary body of laws explicitly addressed to the solution of problems pred
icated upon work-injuries, wholly without regard to notions of fault, it may b
of some significance to note that in the Restatement this sociological problem i
still discussed under the heading of "Wrongs." Cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Par
ramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
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decisions which are circulated long after any circumstance to which
they might apply has ceased to exist, it may nevertheless be stated
that any remnants of the inexorable command of "full faith and
credit" which might have endured beyond the Ohio case would erect
no barriers to Oregon's entertaining the Washington wrongful death
statute action in Willianzson stripped of the Washington compensa-
tion-law defense, because Willianison does not involve a common-law
action against the employer who sought to purchase immunity from
such suits by subscription to workmen's compensation insurance.
Willia mson involves a third-party tortfeasor-a stranger to the em-
ployer-employee relationship for which compensation was designed.
The best that might be said of the defendant in Williamson is that his
treatment by legislative provisions in workmen's compensation laws,
like that of Lanza, has varied from state to state. Even assuming that
the Washington compensation law should be held applicable to Wil-
lianson, for reasons subsequently discussed, it is certainly much more
"obnoxious" to Oregon than the Massachusetts statute which the
California courts were permitted to disregard in Pacific Employers.
There is no known constitutional barrier to the Oregon court's
classification of the cause of action as a tort problem and accepting
the reference to the law of Washington while viewing the tendered
defense thereto as a work-injury policy question as to which Oregon
policies might be accepted in disregard of Washington policy."8
Assuming that the facts are as stated, and leaving aside the tort
aspects of the case, the only conflict of laws problem to which constitu-
tional provisions conceivably might be thought applicable in William-
son is presented by the collision of the respective compensation laws
of Washington and Oregon. The Washington compensation law
creates an immunizing defense to this suit which the Oregon compen-
8;. The writer is not aware of any decision by the United States Supreme
Court in which it has been held that any constitutional provision compels a state
court having proper jurisdiction to characterize or classify an issue in the same
category for conflict-of-laws purposes as would some other state, where both
states' systems of law have a close and substantial connection with the fact situa-
tion. In the light of its decisions (in addition to Carroll, see notes 14, 35, 38 and
79 supr'a) such a decision would seem unlikely. But of. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l
R.R., 19,4 U.S. 120 (1904). However, the Slater case involved the law of a foreign
nation, not that of a sister-state, and its authority may go no further than to hold
that at connmmon law there is no just and proper method of reducing a periodic-
future-benefit-payment civil-law award (similar to an "open" award for alimony)
to a lump sum for final judgment purposes. Or it may mean no more than that
there is no judicial machinery available in the common-law forum to provide the
type of elief afforded as part of the right under the civil law of the foreign
nation. Cf. Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N.E. 206 (1931). It is
apparent, however, that the description of the issue for adjudication in William-
son is consistent with the "obligatio" theory expressed by Holmes in the Slater
case. However, the Slater case was not predicated upon a wrongful death statute;
the defense on damage difficulties was drawn from the statutes recognizing the
right of recovery, and there were no competing non-tort policy problems involved.
Therefore it need not be regarded as a barrier.
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sation law would not allow. This is precisely the same policy conflict
which the majority postulates in Carroll v. Lanza, and while William-
son presents the converse situation as to the locale of the injury, the
factual connection between the state and the relationship of employer
and employee is at least as strong to support a sufficient legitimate
governmental interest on the part of Oregon as were the facts which
supported application of local compensation policy to extraterritorial
injuries in Alaska Packers and Cardillo, and stronger than in Carroll
v. Lanza. Furthermore, the Oregon compensation law was in fact
applied in this case.
Even if greater validity were attributed to Hunt than what, as has
been submitted, was left after MeCartin, it would present no-reater
impediment to the unrestricted application of Oregon law in William-
son than it did to Arkansas law in Carroll v. Lanza. Taking the
Williamson case as presented in the trial court, there was no Washing-
ton award. Taking judicial notice of the subsequent action, this was
at best a determination that no award would be made pursuant to
Washington law and a recognition that an award had in fact been
made under Oregon law.
Do the tort aspects of Williamson require that a different treatment
be given in application of the full faith and credit clause to a case
involving a conflict between the policy determinations of two states'
workmen's compensation laws? Hughes v. Fetter raises no barrier to
the application by Oregon of Oregon policy because the Oregon courts
have opened, not closed, their doors to a suit for wrongful death
arising under a sister-state statute. Furthermore, the question so
carefully reserved in Hughes v. Fetter is foreclosed in Williamson,
because the plaintiff here by her pleadings has set up her right of
action under the Washington wrongful death statute-not under the
Oregon counterpart. Even conceding the customary conflict-of-laws
rule to which Justice Black refused to lend constitutional force, that it
is the wrongful death statute of the place of injury which governs the
action and defenses thereto, it does not follow that the same underly-
ing concepts for choice of law, which might be thought to embrace the
ordinary defenses to wrongful death actions which are drawn from
the common law, would also necessarily apply to a special defense to
such an action when drawn from one particular local workmen's com-
pensation law.87 It may be significant to note that this defense to a
87. The policies upon which wrongful death statutes are predicated are tort
policies. Workmen's compensation laws are based upon completely different policy,
the social policy applicable to the status of employer-employee relations, which
holds that the burdens and costs of industrial injuries are to be borne, without re-
gard to fault and like the costs of repair and replacement of industrial machinery,
by the industry in which they were sustained. DowNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TON 21 (1924); EOROVITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-16 (1944); 1 LARSON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 2 (1952). Wholly aside from the philosophical
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tort action is cast in the form of an "immunity," and that, at this time,
both by legislation and judicial reconsideration, "immunity" defenses
in the law of torts have fallen into ever-increasing disfavor.,,
Whether or not such a special defense is or should be available de-
pends, in the final analysis, upon the local concept of workmen's
compensation law. The Oregon cases, previously discussed, disclose
that the Oregon courts regard their local workmen's compensation law
as designed primarily for the purpose of giving compensation to the
injured Oregon employee. The law has the admitted incidental effect
of providing immunity from common-law liability for the employer,
who by bearing the costs gets a quid pro quo-but it is not a law
otherwise designed to curtail any additional rights which an injured
employee might have." Furthermore, where the workmen's compensa-
tion laws of other states have emphasized what Oregon regards as the
"incidental" effect of providing immunity for employers, the Oregon
courts have quite properly regarded such laws as "obnoxious" to their
local policy.,'° On the other hand, at least one Washington case9' cited
and discussed by the court of appeals in Williamson, seems to indicate
that the Washington courts regard their local workmen's compensa-
tion law as designed for the purpose of providing immunity for em-
ployers from common-law suits, even though the consequence of af-
fording such immunity is the complete denial of any and all remedies
to an injured employee. It is this Washington law which creates a
special defense for only some of the suits brought under its own death
statute, as urged in the Oregon courts, which presents the only choice-
of-law problem in the case-a problem of choosing between conflict-
ing workmen's compensation law provisions promulgated by states
which have competing interests in a single work-injury. Workmen's
compensation law, a law of status, is not tort law; common-law tort
principles have no legitimate place in its interpretation and applica-
tion.92 In fact, it is generally conceded by both courts and commenta-
tors that the choice-of-law rules worked out for the resolution of tort
inquiry as to the propriety of resorting to a humanitarian-purpose statute enacted
to give the injured workman a remedy in order to deprive him of substantial
rights, the question of the right of an injured workman to recover additional re-
compense for his injury from a stranger to the relationship between his employer
and himself, under a system of law predicated upon a different basis and neither
designed nor satisfactory to regulate that relationship and its consequences, would
seem clearly to be a matter to be resolved by that law which is primarily ad-
dressed to work-injury policy, i.e., the workmen's compensation law.
88. Contemporary legal literature is full of discussions of the inroads upon
ancient, outmoded immunities for the sovereign, the charity, etc., and citations
seem superfluous.
89. For an excellent recent statement fully substantiating this position, see
the opinion of Justice Tooze in Johnson v. Timber Structures, Inc., 203 Ore. 6'70,
281 P,2d 723 (1955).
90. Ibid. See also cases cited note 81 supra.
91. Koreski v. Seattle Hardware Co., 17 Wash. 2d 421, 135 P.2d 860 (1943).
92. 1 LARsON, op. cit. supra note 87, § 1.20.
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problems are not at all suitable for application to problems involving
choice of workmen's compensation laws.9 3
Viewed as a conflict-of-tort-laws problem, Carroll v. Lanza sheds no
more light directly upon the Williamson case than does Hughes v. Fet-
ter, for in Carroll, Arkansas, the forum, was also the place of injury.
But if the language employed by Mr. Justice Douglas means anything,
it means that there is a greater degree of flexibility in the full faith
and credit clause when it relates to a work-injury problem than may be
true with reference to other types of cases, such as are discussed in the
dissent. If it is true that Oregon has "yielded tort law its due" when it
opened its courts to this action for wrongful death in a sister-state and
accepted that state's statute creating the action as its predicate, is it
unreasonable to conclude: (1) There is no conflict-of-tort-laws prob-
lem presented, no more than in Carroll v. Lanza; (2) The sole conflict-
of-laws problem raised by the asserted defense to a tort action is one
which cannot be distinguished from those in the series of decisions rec-
ognizing the competing interests of several states in work-injury
cases, culminating in Carroll v. Lanza; and (3) The fact that "here
it is a common-law action that is asserted against the exclusiveness of
the remedy... "14 against a party other than the immediate employer
in a forum where such an action is wholly proper, against the asserted
defense of an "obnoxious" immunity drawn from a sister-state statute,
does not present a material difference between Williamson and these
other work-injury cases?
If the analysis of the prior decisions by the Supreme Court is sound
and the facts in Williamson stand as "assumed," it might be con-
cluded:
(1) In Williamson, Oregon courts could entertain this suit under
the Washington wrongful death statute, giving it full recognition as
pleaded, but might, nevertheless, give equally full effect to the local
Oregon policy respecting the liability of third parties for work-in-
juries, without regard for the defense bottomed upon the "obnoxious"
Washington workmen's compensation law.9
(2) If the assumptions on Oregon policy are wrong, or if its courts
would not go beyond a simple "tort problem" classification, it would
be free to give full recognition to both the cause of action and the de-
fense thereto bottomed upon Washington law.96
93. Ibid. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 202-06 (1927); STuBERG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 188-91 (1937).
94. 349 U.S. at 412.
95. As a matter of local Oregon policy, there is no hostility to entertaining
wrongful death suits even though the death occured in a sister-state (of. Hughes
v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951)), but the defense asiring from a sister-state's com-
pensation statute is wholly inconsistent with the policy reflected by the Oregon
workmen's compensation law.
96. Cf. Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 118 A.2d 21 (N.J. 1955), a suit
for supplemental compensation under thd McCartin rule, where the court con-
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(3) In neither event would the Supreme Court of the United States
be constrained to interfere with the Oregon court's choice of local
policy because: (a) In this class of cases--work-injuries--every state
now has, to some extent, addressed itself to establishing its own simi-
lar form of remedy for providing simple and certain prompt payment
of compensation, but because of local variations in the measure of such
relief the Supreme Court does not regard constitutional compulsion
towards uniformity as a suitable medium for increasing the certainty
that the saluta7 purpose of workmen's compensation laws can be
effectuated ;O0 (b) Accordingly, the decisions culminating in Carroll V.
Lanza clearly show that the full faith and credit clause, in this class
of cases, requires no more than the same sufficient legitimate govern-
mental interest which will satisfy the requirements of due process;
(c) Irrespective of how any extensively legalistic definition may seek
to recategorize the problem into alien areas of law not particularly
well-suited for the disposition of litigation stemming from a common9
work-injury, there is but one basic policy classification applicable to
these work-injuries, as all states now have enacted worlnen's compen-
sation laws as the primary body of rules addressed to the resolution
of the attendant problems, and the area is one in which there is no
longer any reason to question the state's jurisdiction to legislate.""
cludt.d, upon the basis of a careful and thorough comparison of its local work-
men's compensation policy with that of the sister-state, that the great similarity
of pjheies negatived the assertion of "obnoxiousness," and that it would give fullfaith and credit to the sister-state award as final and conclusive. The courts
reading of decisions of the United States Supreme Court closely parallels thatpresented in this article. The conclusion was not based upon any supposed lackOf local power to enter the supplemental award sought, nor upon the existence
of any constitutional impediment to such action. The court found that the local
workmen's compensation policy was in close accord with that of the sister-state in
which the prior award had been made, and concluded that justice, as locally
regai ded, dictated that full faith and credit should be given to the sister-state
award. While agreement on this definition of "justice" is not to be expected, thepropriety of this ruling seems beyond reproach on the basis of the analysis herein-befnr( set forth. However, it should be noted that this decision would not be
aiith itative in regard to a suit for supplemental compensation under the Ma-Cart in A uV with reference to a prior award from any other state, unless and until
a like finding upon similarity of policies was made.
97. 1 LARsox, op. cit. smjr note 87, 86.50. And see the statement of the lateMr, Justice Jackson, Fult Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Coan-
stitution, 45 COLun L. R v. 1, 25 (1945):
This seems to be a field of law which calls in conspicuous measure for cer-
tainty and order, for an administration of justice that is strict and in a sense
mechanical.... The Full Faith and Credit Clause would not seem to lenditself to sociological, ethical, or economic ends or implications, except that
"certainty and order are themselves constituents of the welfare which it is
our business to discover."
98. Maritime work-injuries and the federal acts are, of course, beyond the
scope of this inquiry,
99. Injury alone in Arkansas is sufficient:For we write not only for this case and this day alone, but for this type
of case... A state that legislates concerning [the problems that follow in
the wake of a work-injury] is exercising traditional powers of sovereignty,Carroll v. Lanza, $49 U.S. 408,413 (1955).
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In the opinion of the writer, the majority in Carroll v. Lanza in-
tended that decision to mark the "end of the road" for Supreme Court
"supervision" of work-injury problems by resort to the full faith and
credit clause in much the same manner as Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan
& Nichols Oil Co.1-0 and Burford v. Sun Oil Co.101 terminated federal
court supervision of another state administrative law problem fre-
quently urged under constitutional provisions. This conclusion is
wholly consistent with the philosophy of Erie and, with the adoption
of workmen's compensation laws as the "specific" for the "treatment"
of work-injuries, it does no violence to the basic policies of all Ameri-
can states in the conflict of laws area. However, it should be taken to
mean no more than that the full faith and credit clause is no longer
to be regarded as a haven for one seeking to escape the liability for a
work-injury duly imposed by the law of the forum in any state acting
in accordance with the requirements of due process. State workmen's
compensation laws, as the recognized solution for the determination
of the multifarious legal aspects of work-injuries, have come "of age,"
and the present majority of the Supreme Court has again disavowed
any design to be drawn into the making of policy determinations
within that framework.
100. 310 U.S. 573, as amended, 311 U.S. 614 (1940).
101. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). To paraphrase Mr. Justice Jackson's statement
quoted in note 97 supra, the majority no longer regards it to be the court's busi-
ness to discover certainty and order in the work-injury law area because it is
persuaded that the full faith and credit clause, as an instrument of constitutional
compulsion, does not lend itself to the sociological, ethical, or economic implica-
tions of work-injuries.
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